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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Thomas Rasmussen appeals from the district court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Disbarment in the underlying attorney 
discipline case. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over attorney discipline 
matters pursuant to Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that 
"[t]he Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission 
to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I: The trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by entertaining the 
OPC's objection to Rasmussen's reinstatement that was filed more than ten days 
after Rasmussen's petition because the reinstatement was not governed by Rule 
14-524 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in The Office of Professional 
Conduct's Reply to Reply to its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of 
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 216). 
Standard of Review. In attorney discipline cases, the trial court's 
interpretation of rules is reviewed for correctness. In re Discipline of Schwenke, 
89 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah 2004). Additionally, whether a trial court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law which is reviewed "under a correction of 
error standard." Xiao Yang Li v. University of Utah, 2006 UT 57 fl 7, 144 P.3d 
1142. 
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ISSUE II: The trial court had discretion to consider the OPC's Opposition 
to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen as a post-judgment motion 
pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Preservation: Notwithstanding the fact the trial court did not state it was 
viewing the OPC's objection as a rule 60(b) post-judgment motion, it entertained 
the motion, and in its March 29, 2011, Order granted, in part, the relief requested 
by the OPC in its motion. (R. at 262). 
Standard of Review: Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on relief 
from a judgment and the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Russell 
v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193. 1194 (Utah 1984). 
ISSUE III: The trial court correctly weighed any aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and properly ruled that the appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's 
violation of the terms of his suspension should be more severe than the original 
sanction. 
Preservation and Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 
UT 44 f^ 17, 164 P.3d 1232. The Supreme Court makes its own independent 
determination as to the appropriate sanction in attorney discipline cases. In re 
Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, IT 9-10, 37 P.3d 11 SO-
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of Appellee, 
submitted herewith: 
2 
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A. Rule 14-6. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
B. Rules 14-501, 14-509, 14-511, 14-512, 14-524, 14-525, and 14-526 
of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"). 
C. Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below: This is an 
appeal in an attorney discipline case of an Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Honorable Judge Dever, disbarring attorney Thomas V. 
Rasmussen from the practice of law for violating the terms of an order of 
suspension. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 21, 2010, the Honorable Judge Dever entered an Order of 
Sanctions suspending Rasmussen from the practice of law for one year, staying 
all but 181 days, for violating Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. (R. at 145-169). On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen filed a 
Verified Petition for Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 204-206). 
On January 24, 2011, Rasmussen also filed an Affidavit of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen attesting to the court that he had not practiced law for a total of 181 
days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement. (R. at 207-208). 
In preparation for its response to Rasmussen's petition, and pursuant to 
rule 14-525 of the RLDD, the Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), served 
Rasmussen with interrogatories and requests for production on February 1, 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2011. (R. at 211). Furthermore, the OPC prepared notice of Rasmussen's 
petition for reinstatement to be published in the next edition of the Utah Bar 
Journal as required by rule 14-524(d). (R. at 227). 
On February 17, 2011, Rasmussen delivered to the OPC, and submitted to 
the trial court, a proposed Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. 
The trial court signed the Order on the same day. (R. at 213). On the following 
day, February 18, 2011, not knowing the trial court had already signed the order, 
the OPC mailed its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 215-218). The opposition was based on the 
OPC's position that Rasmussen's Order for Reinstatement was premature 
because, pursuant to rule 14-525, the OPC had 60 days in which to object to the 
petition for reinstatement upon which the order was based. (R. at 215). 
In response to the OPC's objection, on February 25, 2011, Rasmussen 
filed a Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas 
V. Rasmussen, in which he asserted, for the first time, that his reinstatement was 
governed by the provisions of rule 14-524, and as a result, the OPC's objection 
was filed too late.1 (R. at219). 
Upon learning that the trial court had already signed the Order of 
Reinstatement, and that Rasmussen was claiming reinstatement under the 
provisions of rule 14-524, the OPC filed its Reply to its Memorandum in 
1
 As will be discussed in more detail below, 14-525 allows 60 days for the OPC to 
object, whereas 14-524 allows only 10 days. 
4 
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Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen on February 25, 
2011, arguing that because the original suspension was for a term of one year, 
with all but 181 days stayed, Rasmussen's suspension should be categorized as 
being more than six months, and therefore, his reinstatement should be 
governed by rule 14-525. The OPC further informed the trial court that it would 
oppose reinstatement based on information it had received that Rasmussen had 
continued to practice law while on suspension. (R. at 216-222). In its brief, the 
OPC asked the trial court to set aside the Order of Reinstatement it had signed 
on February 17, 2011. (R. at 222). 
The trial court held a hearing (the "Affirmation Hearing")2, on March 8, 
2011. (R. at 241). At the hearing the trial court stated it was its original intention 
that Rasmussen's suspension be for one year, and that his reinstatement "fall 
underneath 525." (R. at 558 p. 25). However, the trial court acknowledged its 
original sanctions order was not clear as to the period of suspension and that 
Rasmussen had relied on his interpretation that he was suspended for less than 
six months. (R. at 558 p.25-27). In "the interest of fair play and equity," the trial 
court determined it could not set aside the Order of Reinstatement. (]d.) With 
regard to the OPC's request to present evidence that Rasmussen had practiced 
law while on suspension, the trial court ruled from the bench as follows: 
2
 In the Brief of Appellant, Rasmussen assigns various names to the orders of the 
trial court (i.e. "Affirmation Order"), and hearings before the trial court (i.e. 
"Motion Hearing). To avoid confusion before this Court, the OPC will use the 
same designations assigned by Rasmussen. 
5 
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THE COURT: I think that if there's any problems with what he's done 
during that 181 days, certainly the OPC has the right to come back 
before the Court here and see if he violated the conditions of his 
suspension; and the Court then can entertain whether or not there 
should be another charge Mr. Rasmussen [sic] or an additional 
period of suspension ordered in this case. 
(R. at 558 p. 27). 
At the conclusion of the Affirmation Hearing, the trial court asked the OPC 
to prepare a written order. Qd.) However, prior to the OPC submitting its 
proposed Order, Rasmussen submitted to the trial court his own proposed order 
that read, in part, "In the interest of fair play and equity, the Court will not set 
aside its Order of Reinstatement dated February 17, 2011, as it was signed 
consistent with Rule 14-524, of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability." 
(R. at 265-266). The OPC objected to the language in the proposed order i 
because the trial court had made no findings with regard to rule 14-524. (R. at 
242-243). The Order ("Affirmation Order") ultimately issued by the trial court on 
March 30, 2011, read: 
The Court will not set aside its Order of reinstatement dated 
February 17, 2011. Thus, said Order will remain in full force and 
effect. However, the OPC may bring any information to the Court ' 
that it might have that Mr. Rasmussen acted in violation of its Order 
of Sanctions in this case dated July 20, 2010. 
(R. at 262-263). 
Accordingly, on March 17, 2011, the OPC filed with the trial court its 
Motion for the Court to Consider Evidence of Thomas v. Rasmussen's Failure to 
Comply with its Sanctions Order. (R. at 245-259). The OPC submitted evidence 
6 
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to the trial court that, during the term of his suspension, Rasmussen had "made 
36 appearances on cases [and] filed 17 pleadings in cases." (R. at 251, 258-
259). 
In his response to the motion, Rasmussen asserted that for the cases in 
which he appeared or filed pleadings during his suspension, he was either, 1) 
withdrawing as required by rule 36 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; 2) 
performing work "in an effort to not leave [his] pre-suspension clients with the 
feeling of abandonment and also to avoid any potential complaints" to the OPC; 
or 3) postponing completion of the case until after being reinstated. (R. at 269-
270). Rasmussen also stated that in contrast to the approximately twenty cases 
he worked on during his suspension, he would typically be retained on 108 new 
cases during a six month period of time. Thus, Rasmussen viewed his conduct 
as constituting "substantial compliance" with the trial court's order that he not 
practice law for 181 days. (R. at 270). 
Furthermore, Rasmussen stated during the term of his suspension it was 
necessary for him to incur, on average, $11,000 a month in office expenses in 
order to maintain a continuing presence in the community. (R. at 270). 
The trial court held a hearing (the "Motions Hearing") on May 19, 2011. (R. 
at 521). At the hearing, the trial court questioned Rasmussen about his 
appearances in court: 
THE COURT: When was that appearance with Judge Trease? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: December 17th. So Dec--
7 
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THE COURT: How can you argue that you have a right to go to 
Court on December 17th when you're suspended on August until 
February? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: I should not have done that. I should not have 
done that. There's no question that I made judgment calls that were 
probably, in hindsight, errant judgment calls to try to facilitate clients. 
Mr. Walker does not know what conversations I did or did not have 
with those clients. 
THE COURT: Well, how could you take on new cases and enter 
appearances of Counsel in cases during the period of time when 
you're suspended by me? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: There were a couple where I did that, Judge, 
and I'm - -
THE COURT: Well, he says there's seven of them. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I was going to lose my house. I was going 
to lose everything that I've worked 30 years for. I've had other 
attorneys come up to me after the fact and say, "Boy, if you'd have 
just asked we would have taken over your practice and helped you 
out." 
Well, my mind doesn't think that way. I'm not scheming for ways to 
intentionally deceive; but Judge, this has been devastating to me. I 
have incurred over $100,000 in debt, used up my savings. I have a 
house that is almost paid that was at risk. I have the - - kind of the 
infrastructure of a law practice I was desiring to return to and did 
return to that was at risk. 
I was hoping not to lose everything in life, and I definitely, definitely, 
definitely curtailed my efforts except when it became life or death, if 
you will, in terms of my complete and utter financial ruin. 
(R. at 557 p. 15-16). 
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued an Order 
e "Disbarment Order"), on July 19, 2011, finding that Rasmussen had 
8 
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continued to practice law while on suspension, and concluding that the 
appropriate sanction for his conduct was disbarment. (R. at 522-526). 
Rasmussen is appealing that order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. It was the intent of the trial court, and the understanding of the OPC, 
that Rasmussen's original suspension was for a period of one year, and that his 
reinstatement would be governed by the provisions of rule 14-525. Thus, the 
OPC would have 60 days in which to oppose reinstatement, rather than the 10 
days allowed under rule 14-524 for a suspension lasting six months or less. 
Because the OPC's opposition was filed within 60 days of Rasmussen's verified 
petition for reinstatement, it was timely and the trial court did not err in 
considering the motion. 
II. The trial court has broad discretion in considering whether to 
consider a post-judgment motion, and whether to view an inadequately captioned 
motion as a rule 60(b) motion for post-judgment relief. In the present case the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in viewing the OPC's objection to the order 
of reinstatement as a post-judgment motion or in allowing the OPC to present 
evidence that Rasmussen violated the terms of his suspension. The doctrine of 
res judicata did not bar the trial court's consideration of Rasmussen's conduct 
because the issue was not, and could not have been, litigated in the OPC's 
original objection to the proposed order of reinstatement. 
9 
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III. Consistent with case law from this Court, the trial court correctly 
determined that Rasmussen's sanction for continuing to practice law while on 
suspension should be more severe than the original term of suspension. 
Furthermore, the trial court properly found that Rasmussen's need for money 
was not a mitigating circumstance, and that, considering the aggravating factors, 
disbarment was the appropriate sanction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED 
PURSUANT TO RLDD 14-524, THEREFORE NEITHER THE TRIAL 
COURT NOR THE OPC WERE CONSTRAINED BY THE TEN-DAY 
OBJECTION PERIOD. 
Depending on the length of the suspension, reinstatements are governed 
by either RLDD Rule 14-524 or 14-525. Rule 14-524 provides, in its entirety, 
that: 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less 
pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of 
the period of suspension upon filing with the district court and 
serving upon OPC counsel an affidavit stating that the respondent 
has fully complied with the requirements of the suspension order and 
that the respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's Lawyer's Fund for 
Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of the 
respondent's conduct. Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an 
objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing. 
(Emphasis added). In contrast, RLDD 14-525 provide, in part, that: 
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a 
disbarred respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of 
the district court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three 
months before the period for suspension has expired.... 
10 
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(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, 
filed with the district court... 
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time respondent files a petition 
for reinstatement or readmission, O P C counsel shall publish notice of the 
petition in the Utah Bar Journal.... 
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's 
petition for reinstatement or readmission, O P C counsel shall either: (f)(1) 
advise the respondent and the district court that O P C counsel will not 
object to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or (f)(2) file a 
written objection to the petition. 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by O P C counsel, the district 
court, as soon as reasonably practicable and within a target date of 90 
days of the filing of the petition, shall conduct a hearing... 
(Emphasis added). The issue of whether Rasmussen's suspension and 
reinstatement were governed by the provisions of 14-524 or 14-525 is not directly 
before this Court. While Rasmussen has maintained the provisions of 14-524 
are applicable, the OPC has urged the application of 14-525. Although the trial 
court stated it was its original intent that 14-525 would govern, it never 
specifically ruled under which provision it was reinstating Rasmussen, and 
neither party has specifically appealed this issue. In fact, because the trial court 
signed the order reinstating Rasmussen, the procedural question of whether it 
was pursuant to 14-524 or 14-525 is likely moot. 
However, whereas Rasmussen is arguing the trial court exceeded its 
jurisdiction by not enforcing the time limits imposed by 14-524, and whereas the 
O P C maintains that the proceedings were not conducted pursuant to 14-524, a 
11 
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brief discussion of this issue may be necessary to permit this Court to properly 
consider Rasmussen's argument. 
The question of whether 14-524 or 14-525 applies comes down to a 
determination of whether Rasmussen was suspended for a period greater than, 
or less than, six months. 
A. The Conduct of the Parties Evidenced an Understanding that 
Rasmussen's Suspension was Governed by 14-525, Rather than 
14-524. 
In its original Order of Sanction, the trial court imposed "a suspension of 
one year in this matter but will stay all but 181 days." (R. at 169). Near the end 
of the 181 days, Rasmussen submitted to the trial court a Verified Petition for 
Reinstatement. (R. at 204). Such a petition is required by 14-525, not by 14-
524. In his petition, Rasmussen petitioned the court to "please reinstate me at 
the earliest possible time." id. Whereas, absent an objection from the OPC, 
reinstatement under 14-524 is automatic upon expiration of the period of 
suspension, a request to be reinstated "at the earliest possible time" is more 
consistent with a petition filed pursuant to 14-525, where the trial court must take 
specific action before reinstatement can occur. 
On the same day as he filed his verified petition, Rasmussen filed an 
Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen, the only substantive averment of which was, 
"I have not practiced law for a total of 181 days up to the time of my anticipated 
reinstatement in this matter." (R. at 208). The affidavit made no mention as to 
his compliance with the other requirements of his suspension or reimbursement 
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to the Bar's Lawyer Fund for Client Protection, as would be required of an 
affidavit filed under 14-524. 
After receiving the verified petition, OPC counsel prepared a notice of the 
proposed reinstatement to be printed in the Utah Bar Journal. (R. at 227). This 
notice is required by 14-525, not 14-524. Shortly after filing his verified petition 
Rasmussen submitted to the trial court a proposed Order of Reinstatement. (R. 
at 213). Again, such an order is required by 14-525, not 14-524. 
It is apparent from the conduct of the parties that it was understood 
Rasmussen's reinstatement was governed by the provisions of 14-525 rather 
than 14-524. Thus, it was reasonable for the OPC to conclude it had 60 days in 
which to file its objection, rather than the 10 days sought to be imposed by 
Rasmussen after the fact. 
B. It Was the Intent of the Trial Court that Rasmussen's 
Reinstatement be Governed by 14-525, Not 14-524. 
Though not binding on an appellate court, the trial court's interpretation of 
its own order should be given great weight. See, Tucker v. State of Kansas, 711 
P.2d 1343, 1344 (Kan. App. 1986) ("we are constrained to give great weight to 
the trial court's interpretation of its own judgment."); Auer v. Scott, 494 N.W.2d 
54, 58 (Minn. App. 1992) ("generally a trial court's construction of its own decree 
is accorded great weight on appeal."); Kosteleckv v. Kostolechy, 537 N.W.2d 
551, 553 (N.D. 1995) ("construction of its own decree by the trial court must be 
given great weight in determining the intent of the trial court.")(citations omitted); 
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See also, Baculis v. Baculis, 430 N.W.2d 399, 404 (Iowa Sup. 1998); Wilde v. 
Wilde, 326 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1958). However, a trial court's interpretation of 
its own orders is reviewed for correctness. Stevensen v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 
339, 346 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court's original Order of Sanction imposed "a suspension of one 
year in this matter but will stay all but 181 days." (R. at 169). At the Affirmation 
Hearing to consider the OPC's request to set aside the reinstatement order, the 
trial court stated: 
THE COURT: In this matter I - - when I entered this order, the 
suspension in this case, it was my intention that the suspension be 
for one year and I was staying all but the time. So the suspension 
would fall underneath 525. It was my intention that all but six 
months - - you would be suspended for six months and a day, and 
rather than saying that, I said 181 days, thinking in error that that 
was the same thing. 
(R. at 558 p.25) The trial court left little doubt that, in its mind, the suspension 
and reinstatement should be carried out pursuant to the requirements of 14-525. 
Furthermore, following the Affirmation Hearing the trial court rejected a 
proposed order submitted by Rasmussen that included language that the 
reinstatement order "was signed consistent with Rule 14-524." (R. at 265). The 
March 29, 2011 Affirmation Order ultimately signed by the trial court was 
noticeably devoid of any reference to rule 14-524. (R. at 262). 
Given the expressed intent of the trial court, as well as the conduct of the 
parties in seeking and opposing reinstatement, this Court, if necessary, should 
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find that Rasmussen's reinstatement was governed by the provisions of 14-525, 
not 14-524. 
C. Because Rasmussen's Reinstatement was Not Governed by 14-
524, His Proposed Order of Reinstatement was Premature and the 
OPC's Objection was Timely. 
Rasmussen filed his Verified Petition for Reinstatement on January 24, 
2011. At that point the OPC immediately began the process of publishing notice 
in the Utah Bar Journal, as required by 14-525, conducting discovery, and 
preparing its opposition to the reinstatement based upon information it had 
received that Rasmussen had been practicing law while on suspension. 
However, prior to the expiration of the 60 days allowed under the rules for the 
OPC to object, Rasmussen filed a proposed Order of Reinstatement that was 
received by the OPC after the order had already been signed. (R. at 558 p.8). 
Noticeably absent from the filing was a Notice to Submit for Decision or any 
certification that the OPC had been given the opportunity to review the proposed 
order. However, the filing did include a certificate of mailing stating it had been 
mailed to the OPC on February 17, 2011, the same day it was delivered to, and 
signed by, the trial court. (R. at 213-214). 
Aware that by rule it only had five days in which to object to the proposed 
order, the OPC mailed its Objection to Order of Reinstatement on February 18, 
2011. (R. at 215-218). The objection informed the trial court of the OPC's intent 
to more fully oppose Rasmussen's reinstatement within the 60 days allowed by 
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14-525. The OPG later learned the trial court signed the Order on February 17, 
2011, the same day it received it.3 ; 
In his response to the OPC's objection, a pleading captioned Reply to 
Memorandum In Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen, Rasmussen asserted for the very first time that he was pursuing 
reinstatement based on the requirements outlined in 14-524 rather than 14-525. 
(R. at219)4. 
Upon learning that the Order of Reinstatement had already been signed, 
and that Rasmussen was claiming reinstatement based on 14-524, the OPC in 
its reply memorandum asked the trial court to set aside the Order of 
Reinstatement and allow it to proceed under 14-525. (R. at 216)5. 
Because the OPC had no indication prior to Rasmussen's "Reply" brief that 
he was seeking reinstatement based on 14-524, the ten-day objection period 
allowed under the rule should not be a bar to the consideration of the OPC's 
objection, which was originally filed under 14-525, and the trial court did not 
3
 The OPC recognizes that Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allowing a party five days within which to object to a proposed Order is binding 
only on the litigants and does not require the trial court to wait for the expiration 
of the objection period before signing the order. See, Henshaw v. Estate of King. 
2007 UT App. 378 H 25, 173 P.3d 876. 
4
 The Record prepared by the trial court assigns numbers 219 - 225 to 
Rasmussen's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen. The OPC's reply to this memorandum, which follows in 
the Record, and which is titled The Office of Professional Conduct's Reply to 
Reply to Its Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen, is assigned numbers 216 - 227, resulting in partial duplication. 
5
 See Note 4. 
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exceed its jurisdiction when it entertained the motion and granted relief 
accordingly. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE OPC'S 
OPPOSITION AS A RULE 60(b) POST-JUDGMENT MOTION. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons:... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. 
The rule is designed to protect against orders and judgments which, 
in consideration of numerous, oft times unarticulated, reasons, would bring 
about the wrong result. 
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity 
designed to relieve against the harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a 
claim or defense. An equity court may exercise wide judicial 
discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public convenience, 
and this court on appeal will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse of this discretion is clearly shown. 
Bovce v. Bovce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980) (internal citations 
omitted). 
A. The Trial Court had Discretion to Consider the OPC's Opposition 
to the Order of Reinstatement. 
In Darrinqton v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of 
Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to set aside a judgment where the 
impetus was not a properly styled rule 60(b) motion but, as in the present case, 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an objection to a proposed order of judgment. In Partington, the defendant had 
repeatedly failed to cooperate in discovery, resulting in the plaintiff moving for 
sanctions to strike the answer and enter a default judgment. The trial court 
granted the motion and entered a default. However, the default signed by the 
judge, which was to be for liability only, included an amount for damages contrary 
to the trial court's instructions. Upon motion from the defendant, the trial court 
set aside the default and reopened discovery. After additional failures on the part 
of the defendant to cooperate, the plaintiff again moved to strike the answer and 
have the court enter a default judgment. 
The trial court again granted the motion for default on liability only. 
However, when the plaintiff submitted the proposed order it again included an 
amount for damages. The defendant filed an objection to the proposed order, 
but as in the present case, the court signed the order without seeing the 
objection. In supplemental memoranda the defendant argued that the proposed 
order went beyond the scope of the court's oral order and also argued that his 
conduct did not warrant entry of a default judgment. Persuaded by the 
arguments, the trial court again set aside the judgment. 
On appeal the plaintiff argued it was improper for the trial court to set aside 
the judgment because the defendant never filed a proper rule 60(b) motion 
asking it to do so. The appellate court found that "although [Defendant] never 
filed a formal motion asking the court to set aside the default judgment, as 
required by Rule 60(b), they did file a timely objection to the proposed order 
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prepared by [Plaintiffs] counsel." Id. at 457. Additionally, the appellate court 
found that defendant's objection, "though clearly mislabeled, was the functional 
equivalent of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment." And, "most 
importantly, the trial court treated it as such a motion." Jd. Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeals found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for 
considering the motion. 
In the present case, the trial court granted partial relief from the 
reinstatement order pursuant to a post-judgment motion filed by the OPC styled 
"Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen." As was the case in Darrinqton, the order sought to be set aside 
was signed before the objection came to the attention of the trial court. 
Therefore, as a practical matter, it would be unreasonable to require the OPC to 
style its motion as a rule 60(b) post-judgment motion when at the time the motion 
was filed it did not even know the Order it was opposing had already been 
signed. And despite the OPC's failure to caption its motion as a rule 60(b) 
motion, it was well within the discretion of the trial court to consider it as such. 
Of note in the Darrinqton case is the appellate court's statement that, "we 
view [Plaintiff's] argument largely as an attempt to circumvent the merits of 
[Defendant's] assertions by elevating form over substance." jd. This is strikingly 
similar to the present case where Rasmussen, who has admitted to practicing 
law while on suspension, seeks to avoid the consequences of his conduct by 
attempting to elevate the form of the OPC's objection over the substance. 
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Rasmussen cites extensively to this Court's decision in Workers Comp. 
Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co.. 2011 UT 61, 266 P.3d 792, in support of his argument 
that the trial court should not have considered the OPC's Opposition to Order of 
Reinstatement as a rule 59 or rule 60(b) post-judgment motion. (Aplt. Br. at 33-
34). Rasmussen contends that because the OPC did not caption its motion as 
such, or specifically cite to either rule in the body of the motion, the trial court 
should not have entertained it or granted the post-judgment relief. Rasmussen 
misunderstands the holding in Argonaut. 
This Court, in Argonaut, reaffirmed its position as stated in Gillett v. Price, 
2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861, that for rule 59 motions, "the form of a motion does 
matter" and that "post judgment motions to reconsider and other similarly titled 
motions will not toll the time for appeal." Argonaut, fl 11. The Court in Argonaut 
then expanded the Gillett rationale to include rule 60(b) motions and again 
articulated that "the form of a rule 60(b) motion does matter." Id. fl 13. Because 
Argonaut could not have been construed to have filed either a rule 59 or rule 
60(b) motion in compliance with the form requirements, this Court refused to 
consider Argonaut's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction. 
What Rasmussen fails to recognize is that the Gillett and Argonaut 
standards raising form over substance would apply to the present case only if the 
trial court had refused to entertain the OPC's Opposition to Order of 
Reinstatement, and if the OPC appealed that decision to this Court. This Court 
would then predictably dismiss the OPC's appeal because its post-judgment 
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motion was not properly captioned pursuant to Argonaut, and thus unable to 
confer jurisdiction in the appellate court. However, that is not what occurred. 
The trial court exercised it discretion to entertain the motion and then granted 
relief accordingly. Thus, the question of whether the OPC's motion would have 
extended the time for appeal as a rule 59 motion, or whether denial of the motion 
would have been appealable as a rule 60(b) motion, is moot and Argonaut is 
inapplicable. 
Rasmussen seeks to expand the holding in Argonaut to not only foreclose 
appeals based on inadequately captioned post-judgment motions, but to prohibit 
trial courts from even considering such motions. The Argonaut court specifically 
declined to adopt such a broad application: 
We pause to note that district courts have broad discretion in 
determining whether to construe a motion under rule 59 or rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and nothing in our decision 
today precludes a district court from exercising that discretion. 
However, if a motion is not captioned as a rule 59 or rule 60(b) 
motion and does not cite to rule 59 or rule 60(b), a district court does 
not err in failing to construe it as such. 
]d. fn 5. Thus, if in exercising its broad discretion, the trial court refused to 
consider the OPC's post-judgment motion, the OPC would lack sufficient grounds 
for an appeal. However, Argonaut makes clear it was not improper for the trial 
court to entertain the motion and, absent an abuse of discretion, the decision to 
do so will not be upset on appeal. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Considering the 
OPC's Opposition to the Order of Reinstatement. 
This Court has made it clear that, "broad discretion is accorded the trial 
court in ruling on relief from a judgment; and, this Court will reverse that ruling 
only if it is clear the trial court abused its discretion." Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 
1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). See also, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) ("the 
district court judge is vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in 
granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment"). 
"Rule 60(b) is an equitable rule that allows courts to balance the competing 
concerns that final judgments should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust 
judgments should not be allowed to stand." Robinson v. Bagqett, 2011 UT App. 
250, % 24, 263 P.3d 411 (citing Laub v. South Cent. Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 
1306 (Utah 1982). 
This is not a situation where the trial court ruled against the OPC and the 
OPC filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider its ruling, hoping this 
time a decision would come down in its favor. The OPC mailed its Opposition to 
Order of Reinstatement on February 18, 2011, the day after Rasmussen 
provided it with a copy of the proposed Order. At that time the OPC did not know 
that the trial court had already signed the Order. 
Thus, the OPC's opposition to what it believed was a proposed order, 
necessarily converted to a post-judgment motion to have the order set aside. At 
that point, it was logical for the trial court to consider the merits of the arguments 
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made in the opposition brief and determine whether they justified setting aside or 
otherwise modifying the order. This is the very purpose of a rule 60(b) motion. 
In evaluating whether to entertain the OPC's motion to set aside the 
reinstatement order and permit a hearing on Rasmussen's alleged violation of 
the suspension, the trial court likely considered: (1) the circumstances under 
which the Order of Reinstatement was signed; (2) whether the reinstatement was 
governed by 14-524 or 14-525; (3) whether it was reasonable for Rasmussen to 
assume the original suspension was for less than six months; (4) whether it was 
reasonable for the OPC to conclude the original suspension was for more than 
six months; and (5) whether its original Order of Sanctions included errors that 
led to the confusion among the parties. 
Clearly, after considering the issues before it the trial court determined, in 
its discretion, that it would be proper to entertain the merits of the OPC's motion 
and, notwithstanding its prior order that Rasmussen be reinstated, hear evidence 
that he had violated the terms of his suspension. 
Rasmussen argues that the OPC was not entitled to post-judgment relief 
under rule 59 or rule 60 because the evidence the OPC presented regarding 
Rasmussen's practice of law while on suspension did not meet the criteria of 
"newly discovered" evidence under either subsection (a)(4) of rule 59 or 
subsection (b)(2) of rule 60. (Aplt. Br. at 36-37). However, Rasmussen fails to 
recognize the broad discretion inherent in subsection (b)(6) of rule 60 that allows 
a trial court to relieve a party for "any other reason justifying relief from the 
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operation of the judgment." The trial court signed the Order of Reinstatement 
prior to receiving the OPC's objection. Upon receiving the objection, the trial 
court learned for the first time that Rasmussen may have violated the terms of his 
suspension by continuing to practice law. The trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in finding that this information justified partial relief from the operation 
of the order. 
C. The Signing of the Reinstatement Order was the Result of 
Mistakes, Assumptions and Miscommunications. 
"The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently broad to permit the court to 
set aside its former order which appeared to have been entered upon an 
erroneous assumption and to enter a new order based upon the record before it." 
Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 76 (Utah 1973). 
The trial court's signing of the Order of Reinstatement was the culmination 
of several mistakes, assumptions and miscommunications by all the parties 
involved. These circumstances provide the context as to why it was appropriate 
for the trial court to exercise its broad discretion in construing the OPC's 
objection as a post-judgment motion, addressing the merits of the motion, and in 
allowing the OPC to present evidence of Rasmussen's violation of his 
suspension order in a subsequent hearing. 
The mistakes leading up to the signing of the Order of Reinstatement can 
be briefly summarized as follows: First, the trial court mistakenly stated in its 
original Order of Sanctions that the length of the un-stayed portion of 
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Rasmussen's suspension was for 181 days, rather than stating it was for six 
months and a day, which was the court's intent. Second, Rasmussen mistakenly 
assumed his suspension was for less than six months, and therefore that his 
reinstatement was governed by 14-524. Third, Rasmussen failed to provide the 
OPC five days within which to object to the proposed Order of Reinstatement 
before submitting it to the trial court. Fourth, the trial court and the OPC 
miscommunicated about whether the OPC intended to object to the proposed 
reinstatement order. 
The trial court admitted it was error for the original sanctions order to 
characterize the suspension as being for 181 days, rather than six months and a 
day. (R. at 558, p25 and 27). At the Affirmation Hearing, the trial court 
acknowledged this problem: 
THE COURT: So your position is, is that the Court's ruling of 181 
days, which the Court thought up as being six months and a day, 
meaning more than six months, it is defective in saying 181 days 
was an error, and the Court made the error, and you relied upon that 
error, and therefore you should fall under the 524; is that what you're 
saying? 
MR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I am saying that I relied on paragraph 1, 
and I can see where in the preamble to the four conditions entered 
in the Court's order that it says that it's a suspension for one year; 
but it also talks about staying all but 181 days. Then when it further 
references, by the end of the 181 day suspension, I was led to 
believe and relied on the fact that the suspension would only be in 
actual time a 181 day suspension. 
(R. at 558 p.23-24). 
THE COURT: So the question now comes down to the fact is, is that 
based upon the Court's decision in this matter in a ruling, order that 
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was entered in this case, and not being clear, that whether or not Mr. 
Rasmussen is allowed to rely upon that, comply with what the Court 
said he had to do to be reinstated and file the necessary documents. 
(R. at 558 p.25). Because Rasmussen relied on his interpretation that he was 
applying for reinstatement following a suspension of less than six months, the 
trial court, in its March 29, 2011, Affirmation Order gave him the benefit of his 
interpretation and refused to set aside the Order of Reinstatement. However, 
because the OPC relied on its interpretation that Rasmussen was applying for 
reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months, the trial court 
appears to have given it the benefit of its interpretation by subsequently allowing 
the OPC to present the evidence it would have been allowed to submit in a 14-
525 reinstatement hearing. 
Given the trial court's admission that the reinstatement order was 
improperly worded, fostering the divergent interpretations by the parties, it was a 
proper, if not exemplary, use of the trial court's discretion to allow both parties the 
benefit of their interpretation while at the same time carrying out its duty to 
ensure that the underlying disciplinary matter was administered in "the interests 
of the public, the courts, and the legal profession." RLDD Rule 14-501 (d). 
D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Did Not Bar The Trial Court's 
Consideration of Evidence that Rasmussen Continued to Practice 
Law While on Suspension. 
Rasmussen argues the trial court was precluded by res judicata from 
considering evidence of his violations at the Motions Hearing. (Aplt. Br. at 29). 
As noted by Rasmussen, the doctrine of res judicata "means that neither of the 
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parties can again litigate that claim, demand or cause of action or any issue, 
point or part thereof which he could have but failed to litigate in the former 
action." Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981). 
The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. See, Murdock v. Sprinqville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65. It 
is unclear from Rasmussen's brief upon which of these two distinct branches he 
is relying. However, because each branch has a requirement that the claim or 
issue must have been actually addressed in the prior proceeding, Rasmussen's 
argument fails under either branch. 
For claim preclusion to apply, Rasmussen must establish that: 
"(i) both cases must involve the same parties, their privies or 
assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred either must have been 
presented or have been available to be presented in the first case; 
and (iii) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits." 
jd- at 1j 16. As will be discussed below, Rasmussen has failed to establish 
that the second element of this doctrine has been satisfied. The issue of whether 
Rasmussen continued to practice law while on suspension was not presented, 
nor was it available to be presented, to the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing. 
The four elements of the other branch of res judicata, issue preclusion, 
are: 
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have 
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the 
one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action 
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must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
jd. Again, Rasmussen has failed to show that the issue of his continued 
practice of law while on suspension was "completely, fully, and fairly litigated" in 
the Affirmation Hearing, and therefore, he is unable to invoke this doctrine as a 
bar to the trial court's consideration of this issue at the subsequent Motion 
Hearing. 
Rasmussen's position is apparently based on (1) the fact that the OPC had 
obtained evidence of Rasmussen's improper conduct prior to the Affirmation 
Hearing and (2) the OPC's statement to the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing 
that it had such information. (Aplt. Br. at 30). 
As with his after-the-fact attempts to characterize his petition for 
reinstatement as being pursuant to a more favorable rule, Rasmussen is now 
attempting an after-the-fact re-characterization of the nature and purpose of the 
Affirmation Hearing in order to invoke a favorable doctrine. 
The trial court signed Rasmussen's Order of Reinstatement as a result of a 
miscommunication between the trial court and the OPC that led the trial court to 
believe the OPC would not oppose the order. (R. at 558, p.25-27). However, as 
noted above, the OPC had already begun the process of opposing reinstatement, 
and was unaware that Rasmussen was seeking reinstatement based upon a rule 
that neither the OPC nor the trial court believed was applicable. Once it learned 
the proposed order had been sent to the trial court, the OPC immediately 
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opposed the order, not knowing the trial court had signed it the same day. As a 
result, the OPC requested in its reply brief that the trial court set aside the Order 
of Reinstatement. This request is what prompted the trial court to hold the 
Affirmation Hearing on March 8, 2011. 
Thus, the issue before the trial court at the Affirmation Hearing was not 
whether Rasmussen had continued to practice law while on suspension, but 
rather would the trial court set aside the Order of Reinstatement, based on the 
OPC's argument that Rasmussen's petition was premature, and would the trial 
court allow the OPC to present evidence of Rasmussen's violations at a 
subsequent hearing. It was this specific request for relief that was ruled upon by 
the trial court: 
THE COURT: The question is, is should the Court now set aside that 
order. Well, I think in the interest of fair play and equity, I don't think 
I can. I think that the Court made an error here, wasn't clear in its 
order. I said 181 days; 181 days passed, and Mr. Rasmussen 
submitted the order to the Court and the Court signed it. 
I think that if there's any problems with what he's done during that 
181 days, certainly the OPC has the right to come back before the 
Court here and see if he violated the conditions of his suspension, 
and the Court then can entertain whether or not there should be 
another charge Mr. Rasmussen or an additional period of 
suspension ordered in this case. So that would be the order. Mr. 
Walker, would you prepare that for me, please. 
(R. at 558 p. 27). 
Contrary to Rasmussen's assertions, the issue of his continued practice of 
law during the term of his suspension was not litigated in connection with the 
Affirmation Hearing. Additionally, res judicata's bar of issues that should have 
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been litigated in the initial proceeding is equally inapplicable. The Affirmation 
Hearing was not intended to include the OPC's grounds for opposing the 
reinstatement. Its purpose was to determine if the OPC would be allowed to later 
present such grounds. The trial court ruled that it would. This evidence was 
ultimately brought before the trial court at the Motions Hearing, considered for the 
first time, and resulted in Rasmussen's disbarment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER ANALYSIS IN 
DETERMINING THAT DISBARMENT WAS THE PROPER SANCTION 
FOR RASMUSSEN'S VIOLATION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER. 
A. Rasmussen's Sanction for Practicing Law While Suspended Must Be 
More Severe than the Original Sanction. 
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") Rule 14-
606(a) provides that, "the district court or Supreme Court may impose further 
sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order." This 
Court has stated that "to serve as an effective deterrent for further misconduct, 
the penalty for violating an order of suspension must be more severe than the 
original suspension." In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77 J^ 19, 99 P.3d 
837. . 
In the original sanctions order Rasmussen was suspended for one year 
with all but 181 days stayed. While he admits he continued to practice law during 
his suspension, he argues the sanction for his conduct should simply be to lift the 
stay and impose the entire one year suspension. However, the Court's language 
in In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44 fl 24, 164 P.3d 1232, would suggest 
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that, when considering a higher level of sanction, the trial court should impose an 
increase from the entire length of the original suspension, not just the un-stayed 
portion. 
Although [the attorney's] sanction in this matter should be more 
severe than the stayed suspension that he violated, we decline to 
impose a more severe sanction now because the OPC did not 
appeal on this issue. We thus uphold the sanction imposed by the 
district court of a one-year suspension with leave to petition the court 
for probation. But we put the bar and bench on notice that less 
severe terms of suspension and probation are inappropriate 
sanctions for an attorney who violates the terms of an existing 
suspension or probation. 
In Crawley, the trial court imposed a one-year suspension after the 
attorney was found to have practiced law during the six month un-stayed portion 
of a two year suspension. 
In the present case, the trial court properly followed this Court's direction to 
impose a more severe penalty for violating the terms of the suspension, and 
properly exercised its discretion in determining that Rasmussen's conduct 
warranted disbarment. 
Rasmussen argues that his discipline should be governed by RLDD rule 
14-605, rather than 14-606. (Aplt. Br. at 40). While rule 14-605 articulates the 
sanctions that are "generally appropriate" for various types of conduct,6 rule 14-
606 sets forth the principles that "generally apply" in cases involving prior 
discipline. Rule 14-606 reads as follows: 
6
 Rule 14-605 outlines the elements generally required to impose the sanctions of 
disbarment, suspension, reprimand and admonition. 
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Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the 
factors set out in Rule 14-604,[7] the following principles generally apply in 
cases involving prior discipline. 
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon 
a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order. 
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the 
lawyer has previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will 
generally be one level more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously 
received, provided that the harm requisite for the higher sanction is 
present. 
The exact basis for Rasmussen's argument that the rule governing prior 
discipline orders should not apply to his violation of a prior discipline order is 
unclear. He seems to rely on subparagraph (b) for his argument that disbarment 
is only an appropriate next level of discipline if the conduct at issue is "similar to 
that for which the lawyer has previously" been suspended. However, 
subparagraph (b) is not a limitation on subparagraph (a), allowing a higher 
sanction only for similar conduct, as Rasmussen seems to argue. Rather, 
subparagraph (b) simply provides guidance to a court as to what level of sanction 
would be appropriate in situations where an attorney repeats prior misconduct for 
which he has already been disciplined. In other words, it would generally be 
inappropriate to suspend an attorney for misconduct that is similar to that for 
which he was already suspended. In that case, disbarment would be 
7
 Rule 14-604 outlines the factors to be considered in imposing sanctions, 
namely (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or 
actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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appropriate. However, it does not follow, as Rasmussen is attempting to argue, 
that disbarment is only appropriate in prior discipline cases if the conduct is 
similar. 
Simply put, the broad language in 14-606(a) permits the court to "impose 
further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary 
order." The rule inherently accords trial courts discretion in determining the 
appropriate sanction for violation of a prior disciplinary order, and if the required 
harm is present, all the sanctions in 14-605, including disbarment, are available. 
B. Disbarment is the Appropriate Sanction Under a 14-605 
Analysis. 
Rasmussen argues that if the trial court had analyzed his conduct under 
rule 14-605, rather than 14-606, it would have concluded that disbarment was too 
harsh of a sanction. (Aplt. Br. at 43). However, as discussed above, the two 
rules work hand-in-hand, and because Rasmussen's conduct involves violation 
of a prior disciplinary order, rule 14-606 is directly on point. Nonetheless, 
measuring Rasmussen's conduct solely against the guidelines in 14-605 reveals 
that sufficient grounds existed for imposing the sanction of disbarment. Rule 14-
605(a) provides that: 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to 
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or 
potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal 
proceeding;... 
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In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Disbarment, the 
trial court found that Rasmussen "blatantly disregarded the Order of the Court for 
his own financial benefit," that his mental state was "the stated need for money," 
and that "there was injury to the public and to the judicial system." (Id). 
Measured against the elements of 14-605(a)(1), the trial court's findings support 
the sanction of disbarment. 
First, "blatantly disregarding]" the trial court's order satisfies the 
requirement that the attorney knowingly engage in misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(d), where it is prejudicial to the administration of justice to disobey an order of 
the court. Second, the stated "need for money," satisfies the element that the 
conduct be done with the intent to benefit the lawyer. Finally, the trial court found 
injury to the public and the judicial system, thus satisfying the final requirement 
under 14-605(a) for disbarment. 
Notwithstanding that Rasmussen's conduct could be found to justify 
disbarment under a strict application of the standards articulated in 14-605, it 
cannot be overlooked that he was starting from a point well beyond a mere rule 
violation. Rather than impose a "progressive discipline schematic,"8 that takes 
into account the fact that he ignored a prior order of discipline, Rasmussen asks 
this Court to view his conduct as merely a violation of a court order, the contents 
of which are irrelevant. Such an interpretation of the rules is untenable. 
8
 Brief of Appellant at 43. 
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Rasmussen violated a prior order of discipline. Under the circumstances, a 
"progressive discipline schematic" is mandatory, not discretionary. As previously 
noted, this Court "put the bar and bench on notice that less severe terms of 
suspension and probation are inappropriate sanctions for an attorney who 
violates the terms of an existing suspension or probation." In re Discipline of 
Crawley, 2007 UT 441T24, 164 P.3d 1232. 
C. Rasmussen Lied to the Trial Court in the Affidavit He Filed in 
Support of His Reinstatement. 
Rule 14-605 further provides that disbarment is generally appropriate 
where an attorney: 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Near the conclusion of the 181 days of his imposed suspension, and in 
support of his petition for reinstatement, Rasmussen filed with the trial court the 
Affidavit of Thomas V. Rasmussen. (R. at 207-208). The only substantive 
averment in this affidavit was the following statement: "I have not practiced law 
for a total of 181 days up to the time of my anticipated reinstatement in this 
matter." (R. at 208 jf 5). However, at the Motions Hearing Rasmussen admitted 
to practicing law during the 181 days of his suspension, and the trial court 
ultimately found that the affidavit "was not truthful." (R. at 523). In fact, the trial 
court found that "Rasmussen made 36 appearances in 17 courts" during the 
period of his suspension, and that he "was taking on new matters during his 
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suspension." (Jd). Although at the Motions Hearing Rasmussen admitted to 
practicing law while suspended, he argued his financial obligations justified his 
conduct. (R. at 557, p.15-16). He further attempted to explain the misstatement in 
his affidavit by claiming "substantial compliance" based on the fact that he took 
on fewer clients and made less money during his suspension that he would have 
otherwise. 
Rasmussen's dishonesty before the trial court in his sworn affidavit is a 
violation under 14-605(a)(3) that would support this Court's conclusion that the 
appropriate "more severe" sanction for his conduct is disbarment. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Considered Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances Associated with Rasmussen's Continued Practice 
of Law While on Suspension. 
Standards Rule 14-607 instructs that, "after misconduct has been 
established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered and 
weighed in deciding what sanction to impose." 
In the present case, the trial court stated in its July 18, 2011, Order. 
Finally, there are no mitigating circumstances and the aggravating 
circumstances are clear. Rasmussen blatantly disregarded the 
Order of the Court for his own financial benefit. This violation was 
not a single episode but nearly two score. 
Rasmussen admitted he continued to practice law while on suspension 
because he needed the money. However, he argues this is evidence of a 
"personal or emotional problem," and should be considered a mitigating 
circumstance rather than viewed as evidence of a selfish motive. (Aplt. Br. at 
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44). Although in a different context, this Court addressed a similar argument, in 
In re Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, fl 14, 37 P-3d 1150. In Ennenga, the 
attorney was found to have misappropriated client funds. At sanctioning, the trial 
court "concluded that Ennenga's personal and emotional problems [resulting 
from] his inability to meet his regular financial obligations" were mitigating factors. 
]d. (quotations and alterations in original). On appeal, this Court disagreed, 
stating, "[although we understand that the pressure of not being able to meet 
one's financial obligations can be great, we cannot condone the taking of a 
client's money to resolve that problem." The Court concluded by stating, 
"[pjersonal financial pressures cannot mitigate the offense of misappropriation." 
id. 
Given this Court's interest in protecting the public by regulating those who 
may stand before the bar and represent clients, the same rationale considered in 
Ennenga should be applied to the present case. Specifically, this Court should 
find that, "personal financial pressure cannot mitigate the offense of practicing 
law while on suspension. More broadly, it cannot mitigate the offense of blatantly 
disregarding an order of the court. The rationale behind not allowing an attorney 
to use the need for financial gain as mitigation is especially strong when the 
financial pressure is brought about by the attorney's own misconduct. In short, 
the trial court properly found that Rasmussen's continued practice of law for the 
purpose of making money was an aggravating factor, not a mitigating 
circumstance. 
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Rasmussen argues the trial court failed to consider his absence of a prior 
record of discipline as a mitigating factor. Given that Rasmussen was being 
sanctioned for violating a prior order of discipline, it is unclear how the trial court 
could have considered a lack of prior discipline as a mitigating circumstance. 
Rule 14-607(b)(5) allows the trial court to consider as mitigation, "full and 
free disclosure to the...disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any 
misconduct or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings." Rasmussen argues 
the trial court should have taken into account that he "took full responsibility and 
freely disclosed his conduct to the court, maintaining a cooperative attitude 
toward the proceedings." (Aplt. Br. at 45). The trial court became aware that 
Rasmussen was continuing to represent clients, in violation of his suspension 
order, because the OPC, not Rasmussen, brought his conduct to light. 
Furthermore, Rasmussen submitted a false affidavit to the trial court averring that 
he had not practiced law during the period of his suspension. Again, it is unclear 
how the trial court could have considered this to be a mitigating circumstance. 
Rasmussen next asserts the trial court should have considered the OPC's 
delay in presenting the evidence of his unauthorized practice of law as a 
mitigating circumstance pursuant to rule 14-607(b)(10). (Id.) This rule 
encompasses delays in disciplinary proceedings that prejudice an attorney's right 
to have their case heard expeditiously. Rasmussen is apparently referring to the 
fact the OPC waited until after he filed his petition for reinstatement before 
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bringing allegations that he violated the terms of his suspension. This is simply 
not the type of delay contemplated by the rule. 
As an additional mitigating circumstance, Rasmussen argues that the trial 
court should have considered, as "interim reform" under 14-607(b)(11), that he 
ceased his unauthorized practice of law after receiving the OPC's December 
warning letter. Rasmussen did not "reform" his behavior. He merely stopped 
violating the trial court's order after learning that he had been caught. The trial 
court was correct in not considering this as mitigation. 
Next, Rasmussen contends that the $2000 in sanctions he paid to the 
Seventh District Court should be considered as mitigation under rule 14-
607(b)(12). (jd.). However, those sanctions were imposed by a different trial court 
as a result of his conduct which eventually gave rise to the initial suspension. (R. 
at 272). The $2,000 sanction was unrelated to the suspension or the disbarment 
proceedings. Thus, it would be inappropriate for the trial court to consider it as 
mitigation. 
Finally, Rasmussen asserts that the remorse he conveyed at the Motions 
Hearing should have been considered as mitigation pursuant to rule 14-
607(b)(13). (Aplt. Br. at 45). In the words of this Court, "[Rasmussen's] remorse 
at trial is irrelevant." In re Discipline of Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1998). 
The Tanner court went on to explain: 
Naturally, anyone going through a trial for the above wrongdoing 
would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the remorse 
question closely relates to acknowledgment of wrongful conduct: did 
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I 
Tanner feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and 
was he motivated by remorse in making amends? 
]d. (Emphasis in original). 
In sum, the trial court properly considered any aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that were properly before it in determining that disbarment was 
the appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's violation of the order of suspension. 
E. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
IMPOSITION OF THE SANCTION OF DISBARMENT. 
In recent years this Court has considered other cases addressing the issue 
of progressive sanctions in attorney discipline matters. In In re Discipline of 
Doncouse. 2004 UT 77, 99 P.3d 837, an attorney was suspended for three years 
after it was found he violated the terms of a ninety-day suspension. However, in 
In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262 (Utah 1992), this Court ordered disbarment where 
an attorney violated a six month suspension. The difference between the two 
cases is the extent to which the attorneys continued to practice law while on 
suspension. As will be shown, Rasmussen's conduct is more analogous to the 
violations of the attorney disbarred in Johnson.9 
The attorney in In re Johnson, was originally suspended for six months for 
violating the terms of a prior probation. During the course of the six month 
9
 This issue was also addressed in the consolidated case of In re Discipline of 
Crawley. 2007 UT 44, 164 P.3d 1232, where an attorney violated the terms of a 
suspension. This Court declined to impose a sanction more severe than the one 
year suspension imposed by the district court because the OPC failed to appeal 
the issue. 
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suspension, the OPC continued to receive complaints, and it was eventually 
determined that, while suspended, the attorney accepted new clients, provided 
legal advice to clients, held himself out as one authorized to practice law, and 
received compensation from his firm, id- at 263. This Court found that the 
attorney "continued to practice law in flagrant disregard of this court's order of 
suspension." Jd. As a result, the attorney was disbarred. ]d. at 264. 
By contrast, the attorney in In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, 99 
P.3d 837, was found to have practiced law on just three occasions during the 
course of a ninety-day suspension. After considering mitigating and aggravating 
factors, the trial court suspended the attorney for one year. The OPC appealed, 
arguing the attorney should be disbarred. After reviewing the standards for 
imposing sanctions, this Court noted that the distinction between disbarment and 
suspension "lies, in part, in the attorney's motive and in the relative severity of 
the conduct." id-at 1116. 
In that case, the attorney's practice of law while on suspension was limited 
to identifying himself as an attorney in order to access a client in prison, filing a 
reply memorandum on behalf of a client, and accepting a new client in a matter, 
id. at 1|7. This Court found the attorney's actions were not egregious enough, and 
that the level of injury was not severe enough, to warrant disbarment, id at 1J16. 
It distinguished the Johnson case, noting the attorney there "essentially ignored 
the imposition of sanctions and continued] with business as usual." id. at 1J17 
However, in Doncouse, this Court did increase the length of the suspension from 
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one year to three, stating that, "to serve as an effective deterrent for further 
misconduct, the penalty for violating an order of suspension must be more 
severe than the original suspension." Id. at fl19. 
In the present case, Rasmussen made 36 court appearances and filed 17 
pleadings. (R. at 251, 258-259). He not only continued representing his existing 
clients, he took on new matters as well. And his admitted motivation for violating 
the court's order was the need for money. As with the attorney in Johnson, 
Rasmussen "essentially ignored the imposition of sanctions and continued] with 
business as usual." Notwithstanding his argument that he took on fewer matters 
than he otherwise would during the six months of his suspension, it is undisputed 
that Rasmussen continued to practice law in violation of the courts order and that 
his violations were numerous. As such, the trial court correctly imposed the 
sanction of disbarment. 
CONCLUSION 
Rasmussen's suspension was for a period greater than six months, and 
therefore, his reinstatement was governed by the provisions of RLDD 14-525. 
Thus, the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by entertaining the OPC's 
objection that was filed more than ten days after Rasmussen's petition for 
reinstatement. 
The trial court had discretion to consider the OPC's Opposition to Order of 
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen as a post-judgment motion pursuant to 
rule 60(b), and discretion to grant the relief requested in the motion. Because the 
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issue of Rasmussen's violation of the terms of his suspension was not addressed 
in the Affirmation Hearing, the doctrine of res judicata did not prevent the trial 
court from considering the evidence at the Motions Hearing. 
Rasmussen's sanction for violating the terms of his suspension should be 
more severe than the original suspension of one year. The trial court correctly 
weighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and properly ruled that the 
appropriate sanction for Rasmussen's violation of the terms of his suspension 
was disbarment. 
DATED: August 2, 2012. 
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief 
Rule 14-601. Definitions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
As used in this article: 
(a) "complainant" means the person who files an informal complaint or the OPC 
when the OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it has 
received; 
(b) "formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court alleging 
misconduct by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to disability status; 
(c) "informal complaint" means any written, notarized allegation of misconduct by 
or incapacity of a lawyer; 
(d) "injury" means harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession 
which results from a lawyers misconduct. The level of injury can range from 
"serious" injury to "little or no" injury; a reference to "injury" alone indicates any 
level of injury greater than "little or no" injury; 
(e) "intent" means the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result; 
(f) "knowledge" means the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant 
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result; 
(g) "negligence" means the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation; 
(h) "potential injury" means the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or 
the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's 
misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably 
have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct; 
(i) "respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed; and 
(j) "Rules of Professional Conduct" means the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct (including the accompanying comments) initially adopted by the 
Supreme Court in 1988, as amended from time to time. 
Rule 14-602. Purpose and Nature of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. 
(a) Summary. This article is based on the Black Letter Rules contained in the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the American Bar 
Association's Center for Professional Responsibility. They have been 
substantially revised by the Supreme Court. Notably, ABA Standards 4 through 8 
have been reduced into a single Rule 14-605. 
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(b) Purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. The purpose of imposing lawyer 
sanctions is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct 
required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as 
lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers 
who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be 
unable to discharge properly their professional responsibilities. 
(c) Public nature of lawyer discipline proceedings. Ultimate disposition of lawyer 
discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and 
nonpublic in cases of admonition. 
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a 
sanction or sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal 
profession has violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Descriptions in these rules of substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended 
to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a system for determining sanctions, 
permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of 
lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: 
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of 
sanction in an individual case; 
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated 
goals of lawyer discipline; and 
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or 
similar offenses within and among jurisdictions. 
Rule 14-603. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or 
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct. 
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A 
lawyer who has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525. 
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law 
for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be 
imposed for a specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in 
no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more 
than three years. 
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be 
reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-524. 
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may 
be reinstated as set forth in Rule 14-525. 
(d) Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a 
lawyer from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth 
in Rules 14-518 and 14-519. 
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(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the 
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of 
the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. 
(g) Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone 
or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of 
readmission or reinstatement. 
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a 
form of public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of 
law while either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the 
respondent. Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in 
Rule 14-521 
(i) Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and remedies which may be 
imposed include: 
(i)(1) restitution; 
(i)(2) assessment of costs; 
(i)(3) limitation upon practice; 
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver; 
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or 
professional responsibility examination; and 
(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses. 
(j) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary 
sanction on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 14-604. Factors to be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding 
of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 14-605. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
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Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to 
benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious 
or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; 
or 
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or 
the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the 
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of 
another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements 
listed in Rule 14-605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference 
with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little 
or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or interference with a 
legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to 
potential injury or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
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(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in 
this rule that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 14-606. Prior Discipline Orders, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors 
set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in cases involving 
prior discipline. 
(a) The district court or Supreme Court may impose further sanctions upon a 
lawyer who violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order. 
(b) When a lawyer engages in misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has 
previously been disciplined, the appropriate sanction will generally be one level 
more severe than the sanction the lawyer previously received, provided that the 
harm requisite for the higher sanction is present. 
Rule 14-607. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances may be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to 
impose. 
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline 
to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a)(1) prior record of discipline; 
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct; 
(a)(4) multiple offenses; 
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process; 
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary authority; 
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim; 
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
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(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or 
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. 
Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(b)(1) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems; 
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior 
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; 
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(b)(7) good character or reputation; 
(b)(8) physical disability; 
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental 
disability; and 
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to 
the misconduct; and 
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental 
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and 
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the 
respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and provided 
further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the 
delay; 
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or 
impairment; 
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(b)(13) remorse; and 
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses. 
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered 
as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution; 
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(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain. 
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Rule 14-501. Purpose, authority, scope and structure of lawyer 
disciplinary and disability proceedings. 
(a) The purpose of lawyer disciplinary and disability proceedings is to ensure and 
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who 
undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect 
the public and the administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by 
their conduct that they are unable or unlikely to properly discharge their 
professional responsibilities. 
(b) Under Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, the Utah Supreme 
Court has exclusive authority within Utah to adopt and enforce rules governing 
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
(c) All disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with this article 
and Article 6, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Formal disciplinary and 
disability proceedings are civil in nature. These rules shall be construed so as to 
achieve substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters with dispatch and 
at the least expense to all concerned parties. 
(d) The interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession all require that 
disciplinary proceedings at all levels be undertaken and construed to secure the 
just and speedy resolution of every complaint. 
Rule 14-509. Grounds for discipline. 
It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(b) willfully violate a valid order of a court or a screening panel imposing 
discipline; 
(c) be publicly disciplined in another jurisdiction; 
(d) fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 14-526(e); or 
(e) fail to notify the OPC of public discipline in another jurisdiction in accordance 
with Rule 14-522(a). 
Rule 14-511. Proceedings subsequent to finding of probable cause. 
(a) Commencement of action. If the screening panel finds probable cause to 
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint is 
merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district court a formal 
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complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts upon which the 
charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable provisions of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct The formal complaint shall be signed by the 
Committee chair or, in the chair's absence, by the Committee vice chair or a 
screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair. 
(b) Venue. The action shall be brought and the trial shall be held in the county in 
which an alleged offense occurred or in the county where the respondent resides 
or practices law or last practiced law in Utah; provided, however, that if the 
respondent is not a resident of Utah and the alleged offense is not committed in 
Utah, the trial shall be held in a county designated by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. The parties may stipulate to a change of venue in accordance 
with applicable law. 
(c) Style of proceedings. All proceedings instituted by the OPC shall be styled "In 
the Matter of the Discipline of (name of respondent and respondent's Bar 
number), Respondent." 
(d) Change of judge as a matter of right. 
(d)(1) Notice of change. The respondent or OPC counsel may, by filing a notice 
indicating the name of the assigned judge, the date on which the formal 
complaint was filed, and that a good faith effort has been made to serve all 
parties, change the judge assigned to the case. The notice shall not specify any 
reason for the change of judge. The party filing the notice shall send a copy of 
the notice to the assigned judge and to the presiding judge. The party filing the 
notice may request reassignment to another district court judge from the same 
district, which request shall be granted. Under no circumstances shall more than 
one change of judge be allowed to each party under this rule. 
(d)(2) Time. Unless extended by the court upon a showing of good cause, the 
notice must be filed within 30 days after commencement of the action or prior to 
the notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first. Failure to file a timely notice 
precludes any change of judge under this rule. 
(d)(3) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the assigned 
judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall promptly 
determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. If the 
presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall promptly send the 
notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall determine whether 
the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. 
(d)(4) Rule 63 and Rule 63A unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights a 
party may have pursuant to Rule 63 or Rule 63A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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(e) Actions tried to the bench; findings and conclusions. All actions tried 
according to this article shall be tried to the bench, and the district court shall 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither masters nor commissioners 
shall be utilized. 
(f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as reasonably 
practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days after the district court 
enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it shall hold a hearing to receive 
relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and shall within five days 
thereafter, enter an order sanctioning the respondent. Upon reasonable notice to 
the parties, the court, at its discretion, may hold the sanctions hearing 
immediately after the misconduct proceeding. 
(g) Review. Any discipline order by the district court may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court through a petition for review pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedur 
Rule14-512. Sanctions. 
The imposition of sanctions against a respondent who has been found to have 
engaged in misconduct shall be governed by Chapter 14, Article 6, Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 14-524. Reinstatement following a suspension of six months or less. 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to 
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of 
suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel an 
affidavit stating that the respondent has fully complied with the requirements of 
the suspension order and that the respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's 
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts paid on account of the 
respondent's conduct. Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an objection and 
thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing. 
Rule 14-525. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six 
months; readmission. 
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred 
respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the district court. 
No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months before the 
period for suspension has expired. No respondent may petition for readmission 
until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A respondent who has been 
placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that 
was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the 
expiration of five years from the effective date of the interim suspension. 
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(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, filed with 
the district court, and shall specify with particularity the manner in which the 
respondent meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph (e) or, if not, why 
there is otherwise good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or readmission. 
With specific reference to paragraph (e)(4), prior to the filing of a petition for 
readmission, the respondent must receive a report and recommendation from the 
Bar's Character and Fitness Committee. In addition to receiving the report and 
recommendation from the Character and Fitness Committee, the respondent 
must satisfy all other requirements as set forth in Article 7, Admissions. Prior to 
or as part of the respondent's petition, the respondent may request modification 
or abatement of conditions of discipline, reinstatement or readmission. 
(c) Service of petition. The respondent shall serve a copy of the petition upon 
OPC counsel. 
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time a respondent files a petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall publish a notice of the petition 
in the Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform members of the Bar about the 
application for reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any 
individuals file notice of their opposition or concurrence with the district court 
within 30 days of the date of publication. In addition, OPC counsel shall notify 
each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the respondent's 
suspension or disbarment that the respondent is applying for reinstatement or 
readmission, and shall inform each complainant that the complainant has 30 
days from the date of mailing to raise objections to or to support the respondent's 
petition. Notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each complainant in 
OPC counsel's records. 
(e) Criteria for reinstatement and readmission. A respondent may be reinstated 
or readmitted only if the respondent meets each of the following criteria, or, if not, 
presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be 
reinstated or readmitted. 
(e)(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior 
disciplinary orders except to the extent they are abated by the district court. 
(e)(2) The respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment. 
(e)(3) If the respondent was suffering from a physical or mental disability or 
impairment which was a causative factor of the respondent's misconduct, 
including substance abuse, the disability or impairment has been removed. 
Where substance abuse was a causative factor in the respondent's misconduct, 
the respondent shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: 
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(e)(3)(A) the respondent has recovered from the substance abuse as 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
(e)(3)(B) the respondent has abstained from the use of the abused substance 
and the unlawful use of controlled substances for the preceding six months; and 
(e)(3)(C) the respondent is likely to continue to abstain from the substance 
abused and the unlawful use of controlled substances. 
(e)(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was disciplined, the 
respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. In readmission 
cases, the respondent must appear before the Bar's Character and Fitness 
Committee and cooperate in its investigation of the respondent. A copy of the 
Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation shall be 
provided to the OPC and forwarded to the district court assigned to the petition 
after the respondent files a petition. 
(e)(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the law 
and is competent to practice. 
(e)(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the respondent shall be 
required to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. 
(e)(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be required to pass the 
student applicant Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination. 
(e)(8) The respondent has fully reimbursed the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection for any amounts paid on account of the respondent's conduct. 
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: 
(f)(1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will not object 
to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or 
(f)(2) file a written objection to the petition. 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court, as 
soon as reasonably practicable and within a target date of 90 days of the filing of 
the petition, shall conduct a hearing at which the respondent shall have the 
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent 
has met each of the criteria in paragraph (e) or, if not, that there is good and 
sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated or 
readmitted. The district court shall enter its findings and order. If no objection is 
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filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall review the petition without a hearing 
and enter its findings and order. 
(h) Successive petitions. Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, no 
respondent shall apply for reinstatement or readmission within one year following 
an adverse judgment upon a petition for reinstatement or readmission. 
(i) Conditions of reinstatement or readmission. The district court may impose 
conditions on a respondent's reinstatement or readmission if the respondent has 
met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the district 
court reasonably believes that further precautions should be taken to ensure that 
the public will be protected upon the respondent's return to practice. 
(j) Reciprocal reinstatement or readmission. If a respondent has been suspended 
or disbarred solely on the basis of discipline imposed by another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, and if the 
respondent is later reinstated or readmitted by that court, jurisdiction or 
regulatory body, the respondent may petition for reciprocal reinstatement or 
readmission in Utah. The respondent shall file with the district court and serve 
upon OPC counsel a petition for reciprocal reinstatement or readmission, as the 
case may be. The petition shall include a certified or otherwise authenticated 
copy of the order of reinstatement or readmission from the other court, 
jurisdiction or regulatory body. Within 20 days of service of the petition, OPC 
counsel may file an objection thereto based solely upon substantial procedural 
irregularities. If an objection is filed, the district court shall hold a hearing and 
enter its finding and order. If no objection is filed, the district court shall enter its 
order based upon the petition. 
Rule 14-526. Notice of disability or suspension; return of clients' property; 
refund of unearned fees. 
(a) Effective date of order; winding up affairs. Each order that imposes 
disbarment or suspension is effective 30 days after the date of the order, or at 
such other time as the order provides. Each order that transfers a respondent to 
disability status is effective immediately upon the date of the order, unless the 
order otherwise provides. After the entry of any order of disbarment, suspension, 
or transfer to disability status, the respondent shall not accept any new retainer 
or employment as a lawyer in any new case or legal matter; provided, however, 
that during any period between the date of entry of an order and its effective 
date, the respondent may, with the consent of the client after full disclosure, wind 
up or complete any matters pending on the date of entry of the order. 
(b) Notice to clients and others. In every case in which a respondent is disbarred 
or suspended for more than six months, the respondent shall, within 20 days of 
the entry of the order, accomplish the following acts: 
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(b)(1) notify each client and any co-counsel in every pending legal matter, 
litigation and non-litigation, that the respondent has been disbarred or suspended 
from the practice of law and is disqualified from further participation in the matter; 
(b)(2) notify each client that, in the absence of co-counsel, the client should 
obtain a new lawyer, calling attention to the urgency to seek new counsel, 
particularly in pending litigation; 
(b)(3) deliver to every client any papers or other property to which the client is 
entitled or, if delivery cannot reasonably be made, make arrangements 
satisfactory to the client or co-counsel of a reasonable time and place where 
papers and other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency to 
obtain the same; 
(b)(4) refund any part of any fee paid in advance that has not been earned as of 
the effective date of the discipline; 
(b)(5) in each matter pending before a court, agency or tribunal, notify opposing 
counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse party, of the respondent's 
disbarment or suspension and consequent disqualification to further participate 
as a lawyer in the matter; 
(b)(6) file with the court, agency or tribunal before which any matter is pending a 
copy of the notice given to opposing counsel or to an adverse party; and 
(b)(7) within ten days after the effective date of disbarment or suspension, file an 
affidavit with OPC counsel showing complete performance of the foregoing 
requirements of this rule. The respondent shall keep and maintain for inspection 
by OPC counsel all records of the steps taken to accomplish the requirements of 
this rule. 
(c) Lien. Any attorney's lien for services rendered which are not tainted by reason 
of disbarment or suspension shall not be rendered invalid merely because of the 
order of discipline. 
(d) Other notice. If a respondent is suspended for six months or less, the district 
court may impose conditions similar to those set out in paragraph (b). In any 
public disciplinary matter, the district court may also require the issuance of 
notice to others as it deems necessary to protect the interests of clients or the 
public. 
(e) Compliance. Substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b) 
and (d) shall be a precondition for reinstatement or readmission. Willful failure to 
comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) shall constitute contempt of court and 
may be punished as such or by further disciplinary action. 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN, #2693 
4659 So. Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the : ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT OF 
Discipline of: THOMAS V, RASMUSSEN 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693 : Civil No. 090908841 
Judge: L. A. Dever 
Based upon Respondent's Verified Petition for Reinstatement 
and accompanying documentation, and the fact that more than 181 
days from the effective date of the Court's Order of Sanctions, 
dated July 20, 2010, has elapsed, and for good cause appearing, it 
is hereby; 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, & DECREED, that Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693, 
is hereby Reinstated as an Attorney at Law in good standing in the 
State of Utah. 
DATED this day of February, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
FE8 t 7 2011 
ML Office of 
Professional Conduct „,j 
J u d g e L. A. DEVER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage pre-paid a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen to the Office of Professional Conduct at 645 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Dated this IT day of February, 2011. 
A. L. Zd 
Secretary 
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FILED 
mm DISTRICT COURT 
II FEB 18 PM h36 
ALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
BY. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT 
OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Civil No. 090908841 
Judge L. A. Dever 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through 
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), hereby objects to Mr. Rasmussen's proposed 
Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen ("Order"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. RASMUSSEN ORDER IS PREMATURE 
Rule 14-525(f) RLDD states: "Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition 
for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either (1) advise the respondent and 
the district court that OPC counsel will not object to the respondent's reinstatement or 
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readmission; or (2) file a written objection to the petition." Mr. Rasmussen filed his Verified 
Petition on January 24, 2011 and served the OPC with the Verified Petition on the same 
day. Therefore, the OPC has until March 25, 2011 to file its objection, which it intends to 
do. 
It is apparent that Mr. Rasmussen's intent was to file his petition pursuant to 14-525 
of the RLDD because it is verified which is required by 14-525(b) of the rule. Furthermore, 
the Court's Order of Sanction was for a suspension of one year which requires a petition to 
be filed in accordance with 14-525. 
For the Court's information, on February 1, 2011, the OPC sent Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents to Mr. Rasmussen with regard to his reinstatement. 
Mr. Rasmussen has yet to respond to the discovery requests, however, his responses are 
not due until March 2, 2011. The OPC plans to use Mr. Rasmussen's responses to 
supplement the objection it will file on or before March 25, 2011. After the OPC files its 
objection which will detail the basis for a denial of reinstatement, the Court is required to 
hold a hearing pursuant to 14-525(g) of the rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rasmussen's Order is premature and by submitting it to the Court it is the 
OPC's viewpoint that Mr. Rasmussen is attempting to bypass Rule 14-525(f) of the RLDD. 
Therefore, Mr. Rasmussen's Order should not be signed. 
DATED this _ T ? day of February, 2011. 
Billy L Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of February, 2011, I caused to be mailed a 
true and correct copy of the Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen to: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen 
4659 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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THOMAS V, RASMUSSEN, #2693 
4659 So, Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 273-1089 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the : &EPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
Discipline of: OPPOSITION TO ORDER OF 
: REINSTATEMENT OF 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, #2693 
: Civil No. 090908841 
Respondent. 
: Judge L. A. Dever 
OPC's Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of 
Thomas V. Rasmussen, is out of order and lacks any legal authority 
under the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, as it 
completely missed its deadline to object under Rule 14-524* On the 
contrary, this Court properly and legally signed an Order of 
Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen on February 17, 2011. The 
Court's action was in full compliance with Rule 14-524, which 
reads: 
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RULE 14-524. REINSTATEMENT FOLLOWING A SUSPENSION OF 
SIX MONTHS OR LESS 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or 
less pursuant to disciplinary proceedings shall be 
reinstated at the end of the period of suspension upon 
filing with the district court and serving upon OPC 
counsel an affidavit stating that the respondent has 
fully complied with the requirements of the suspension 
order ... . Within ten days, OPC counsel may file an 
objection and thereafter the district court shall 
conduct a hearing. 
The Court's Order of Sanction executed on July 20, 2010, primarily 
required that Respondent "enter and complete an ethics and 
professional conduct course by the end of the 181 day suspension" 
and "not practice law during the [181 day] suspension and so 
certify that fact by affidavit", which is the very same requirement 
as contained in Rule 14-524. It is clear on the face of Rule 14-
524 that both the Court and the Respondent have fully complied with 
the requirements of the Rule. It is equally apparent that OPC is in 
non-compliance with the above-stated Rule, as it filed an objection 
to the Court's Order of Reinstatement on or after February 18, 
2011, well beyond the 10 days deadline specified in Rule 14-524 for 
the filing of an objection by OPC counsel or the granting of a 
hearing by the Court. 
The timeline below illuminates the analysis and conclusions 
mentioned above. 
1. July 20, 2010, Order of Sanction signed by District Court 
Judge L. A. Dever. 
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2. August 19, 2010, effective date of suspension pursuant to 
Rule 14-526* 
3. January 24, 2011, filing of required affidavit with the 
district court and service of the same upon OPC, pursuant to Rule 
14-524. 
4.. February 7, 2011, deadline for the filing of an objection 
by OPC counsel, pursuant to Rule 14-524 and Rule 6(a), URCP« 
5. February 16, 2011, is the last day of the Court's 181 day 
suspension, under its Order of Sanction dated July 20, 2010. 
6. February 17, 2011, Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen was signed by District Court Judge L. A. Dever, on the 
182nd day after the effective date of suspension, pursuant to the 
Court's Order of Sanction. 
7. February 18, 2011, date appearing on OPC's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. 
8. February 19, 2011, six (6) months from the effective date 
of the Court's Order of Sanction. 
Again, the above timeline demonstrates conclusively that both 
Respondent and the Court fully complied with the requirements of 
Rule 14-524, while OPC counsel did not comply with the 10 days 
deadline to file its objection. Therefore, without a timely 
objection by OPC counsel, it was not incumbent on the district 
court to conduct a hearing in the matter. 
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The fact that Respondent filed a Verified Petition for 
Reinstatement needs to be explained. On or about December 20, 
2010, Respondent received a copy of a letter drafted by Diane 
Akiyama, Assistant Counsel, OPC, containing the erroneous statement 
that Respondent 
"has been suspended for six months and a day. 
... we [OPC] have not received anything from 
Mr. Rasmussen regarding his obligations under 
Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability. 
I direct your attention to Rule 14-526 of the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability with 
respect to Mr. Rasmussen's responsibilities.". 
While Respondent believed the above-mentioned content of OPC's 
December 20, 2010, letter to be in error, based on the exact 
wording of the Court's July 20, 2010, Order of Sanction, he decided 
to file a Verified Petition for Reinstatement with the Court, 
pursuant to Rule 14-525, and also to file an affidavit with OPC 
counsel, pursuant to Rule 14-526. This action was taken out of an 
abundance of caution and fear, as Respondent was trying to avoid 
complete financial ruin by covering all the bases in an effort to 
eliminate any unnecessary delay in his reinstatement to practice 
law. 
Respondent had always operated under the belief that his 
suspension was a Rule 14-524 suspension and, therefore, conducted 
his affairs accordingly. He also believed OPC considered his 
suspension to be one of "6 months or less" when OPC remained 
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completely silent with regard to any perceived responsibilities 
under Rule 14-526, including the filing of an affidavit with OPC 
counsel that would have been due on or before August 19# 2010 • It 
was not until after December 20, 2010, that Respondent received any 
indication from OPC that it considered Rule 14-526 to be applicable 
to his suspension. The December 20, 2010, letter was composed by 
OPC five months after the execution of the Court's Order of 
Sanction and four months after the effective date of Respondent's 
suspension, therefore, OPC should be estopped from asserting that 
Rule 14-525 and 14-526 apply in this matter. As mentioned earlier, 
the December 20, 2010, letter erroneously states that Respondent 
was suspended for "6 months and a day", which is not the language 
of the Court's Order• If OPC truly believed that Rule 14-525 
dealing with a suspension "more than six months" was applicable, it 
should have timely notified Respondent and/or the Court of 
Respondent's failure to file an affidavit with them, on or before, 
August 19, 2010, Clearly, OPC was silent on this matter, causing 
Respondent to rely to his potential detriment on OPC's silence an 
inactivity, while all the time holding fast to the language of the 
Court's Order. As to the interpretation of Rules 14-524, 14-525 
and 14-526, it is unmistakable from the language of each respective 
Rule that the relevant time period applicable to Respondent is 
either "six months 
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or less" or "more than six months". " [S] ix months" is clearly 
being used as a Term of Art, in the above-mentioned Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability. Nowhere in the relevant Rules is there 
any reference to "days" being used as the metric for determing 
whether a suspension is "six months or less" or "more than six 
months". Rules 14-524, 14-525, and 14-526 are unambiguous in the 
use of the words "six months" as the appropriate marker of time 
with respect to a suspension. There is absolutely no hint or 
suggestion in those Rules that 180 days is a synonym for six 
months. Therefore, Respondent has always believed that his 
suspension was pursuant to Rule 14-524. While Respondent filed a 
Verified Petition, etc. out of fear of confusion and delay 
emanating from the erroneous content of OPC's letter dated December 
20. 2010, he continued to reflect on the actual language of the 
Court's Order of Sanction and was renewed in his belief that Rules 
14-525 and 14-526 did not apply to his suspension. His belief was 
further renewed in the fact that Rule 14-524 governed his 
suspension thereby requiring OPC to file any objection to his 
reinstatement by February 7, 2011. With no objection being timely 
filed by OPC counsel, Respondent resolved that he was free to 
approach the Court without any obstruction, challenge or objection 
by OPC after the conclusion of his 181 day suspension. Judge Dever 
lawfully, courteously, and without delay signed the Order of 
Reinstatement on February 17, 2011. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In summary/ the Court's lawful Order reinstating Thomas V. 
Rasmussen as an attorney at law in good standing in the State of 
Utah should stand/ pursuant to Rule 14-524, and OPC should be 
barred and estopped from objecting or arguing otherwise, as they 
have not timely acted upon relevant deadlines contained in the 
applicable Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
DATED this ZM day of February, 2011. 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the *^( day of February, 2011/ I 
caused to be hand delivered/ facsimiled/ or mailed postage pre-paid 
a true and correct copy of the Reply to the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen. 
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Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: ] 
Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693 ] 
Respondent. 
) THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL 
} CONDUCT'S REPLY TO REPLY TO 
| ITS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
I TO ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT 
> OF THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
I Civil No. 090908841 
Judge L. A. Dever 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through 
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), hereby submits its Reply to Mr. Rasmussen's 
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen ("Order"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPC HAS MADE NO ERROR, ITS ACTIONS HAVE BEEN 
CONSISTENT WITH ITS POSITION THAT MR. RASMUSSEN'S 
REINSTATEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PURSANT TO RLDD 
14-525 NOT 14-524 
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The OPC has made no error in this case. The OPC's actions have been consistent 
with the position that the reinstatement of Mr. Rasmussen should fall under Rule 14-525, 
not 14-524. Mr. Rasmussen's suspension was for one year with all but 181 days stayed, 
which brings it clearly under Rule 14-525(a). Rule 14-525(a) reads as follows: 
A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred 
respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the district 
court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months 
before the period for suspension has expired. No respondent may petition 
for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A 
respondent who has been placed on interim suspension and is then 
disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim 
suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from 
the effective date of the interim suspension. 
Furthermore, even if the non-stayed portion of the suspension (181 days) is the 
standard for reinstatement there is no other reasonable conclusion that can be drawn by 
the "181 days" determination by the Court other than six months and one day (i.e. 30 days 
for a month) which also would place reinstatement under Rule 14-525. It is 
incomprehensible that the interpretation of 181 days is inconsistent with a six month and 
one day suspension because the Court used days instead of months. A strict interpretation 
of "six months" as a "term of art" does not make sense and in OPC's viewpoint is 
inconsistent with the intent of the Court's Sanction Order. 
The OPC did send a letter dated December 20, 2010, to Mr. Rasmussen's attorney 
James Deans. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The letter was not sent 
in error. The letter was sent for the following two reasons: 
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a) The OPC had received information that it was likely that Mr. 
Rasmussen was practicing law while on suspension.1 
b) The OPC had not received information from Mr. Deans or Mr. 
Rasmussen regarding Mr. Rasmussen's obligations under 14-526. 
Specifically, Rule 14-526(b) requires as follows: 
Notice to clients and others. In every case in which a respondent is 
disbarred or suspended for more than six months, the respondent 
shall, within 20 days of the entry of the order, accomplish the 
following acts: 
(1) notify each client and- any co-counsel in every pending legal 
matter, litigation and non-litigation, that the respondent has been 
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and is disqualified 
from further participation in the matter; 
(2) notify each client that, in the absence of co-counsel, the client 
should obtain a new lawyer, calling attention to the urgency to seek 
new counsel, particularly in pending litigation; 
(3) deliver to every client any papers or other property to which the 
client is entitled or, if delivery cannot reasonably be made, make 
arrangements satisfactory to the client or co-counsel of a reasonable 
time and place where papers and other property may be obtained, 
calling attention to any urgency to obtain the same; 
(4) refund any part of any fee paid in advance that has not been 
earned as of the effective date of the discipline; 
(5) in each matter pending before a court, agency or tribunal, notify 
opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse party, of 
the respondent's disbarment or suspension and consequent 
disqualification to further participate as a lawyer in the matter; 
The OPC now has further information that Mr. Rasmussen was practicing during his suspension period and has 
served discovery on Mr. Rasmussen for further verification. The OPC plans to present its evidence of Mr. 
Rasmussen's unauthorized practice of law at the reinstatement hearing provided for in 14-525(g). 
Q 
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(6) file with the court, agency or tribunal before which any matter is 
pending a copy of the notice given to opposing counsel or to an 
adverse party; and 
(7) within two days after the effective date of disbarment or 
suspension, file an affidavit with OPC counsel showing complete 
performance of the foregoing requirements of this rule. The 
respondent shall keep and maintain for inspection by OPC counsel all 
records of the steps taken to accomplish the requirement of this rule. 
The OPC did not state the specifics of the rule in the letter. However, 
the rule does not require OPC to notify Mr. Rasmussen of his 
obligation under Rule 14-526. Thus, there was no error. The letter 
was sent as a courtesy consistent with OPC's understanding and 
position that Mr. Rasmussen was suspended for more than six 
months and reinstatement needs to be pursuant to Rule 14-525. 
It should be noted that Mr. Rasmussen is claiming he felt the OPC was acting in 
error and his Verified Petition for Reinstatement "was taken out of an abundance of 
caution and fear." However, never once, until Mr. Rasmussen's reply dated February 25, 
2011, did Mr. Rasmussen state to the OPC that the OPC was making an error and never 
once did Mr. Rasmussen do anything inconsistent with OPC's understanding that his 
reinstatement would be pursuant to Rule 14-525. As a matter of fact, until now all of Mr. 
Rasmussen's actions including filing a Verified Petition are consistent with reinstatement 
under 14-525 not 14-524. 
A 
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II. MR. RASMUSSEN'S REQUEST FOR REINSTATEMENT WAS AT BEST 
NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 14-524 AND AT 
WORST DECEPTIVE. 
Even if Mr. Rasmussen was entitled to reinstatement under Rule 14-524 his filing 
was at best not consistent with Rule 14-524 and at worst deceptive. Under Rule 14-524: 
A respondent who has been suspended for six months or less pursuant to 
disciplinary proceedings shall be reinstated at the end of the period of 
suspension upon filing with the district court and serving upon OPC counsel 
an affidavit stating that the respondent has fully complied with the 
requirements of the suspension order and that the respondent has fully 
reimbursed the Bar's Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any amounts 
paid on account of the respondent's conduct Within ten days, OPC counsel 
may file an objection and thereafter the district court shall conduct a hearing. 
Mr. Rasmussen submitted a document titled "Verified Petition" to the OPC. In this 
Verified Petition he claims to be in "compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
Court's Order of Sanction, dated July 20, 2010." He did not submit a document titled 
"Affidavit" making this claim. He did submit two Affidavits to the OPC, one claims he did 
not "practice law for a total of 181 days up to his anticipated reinstatement" The other 
Affidavit refers to compliance with 14-526. The 14-526 "Affidavit" on the face of the 
language of 14-524 is inapplicable to 14-524 because 14-524 is for suspensions of six 
months or less and 14-526(b) where an Affidavit is required is for suspensions of more 
than six months. 
The significance of not titling the "Verified Petition" document "Affidavit" is: Had Mr. 
Rasmussen submitted an Affidavit for reinstatement claiming he had complied with all the 
conditions of the Court's Sanction Order, the OPC would have been alerted of Mr. 
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Rasmussen's position that 14-524 was the applicable rule for his reinstatement The OPC 
would have then acted accordingly and submitted its objection to the Court within 10 days. 
Instead, the OPC noted the document as a "Verified Petition" as allowed for under 14-
525(b) and proceeded under 14-525. This included submitting a request to have 
publication of the notice of Mr. Rasmussen's petition in the Bar Journal pursuant to 14-
525(d). Attached as Exhibit "B" is a copy of this notice. 
Furthermore, even if the Court views a Verified Petition as sufficient under 14-524, 
if it was Mr. Rasmussen's intent to be reinstated pursuant to Rule 14-524 and not 14-525, 
his designation of his request for reinstatement as a Verified Petition consistent with the 
language of 14-525 was deceptive.2 The OPC was deceived and Mr. Rasmussen should 
not benefit from this deception. 
111. IN OBTAINING HIS ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT, MR. 
RASMUSSEN DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 7 OF THE RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the 
other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. 
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after 
service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon 
being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
2
 It was especially deceptive when combined with Mr. Rasmussen's other actions, i.e. his reference to 14-526 in one 
of his Affidavits and his request to be "reinstated at the earliest possible time" in his Petition. In this respect under 
Rule 14-524, a respondent would not have to request be reinstated at the earliest possible time, because the rule 
provides for reinstatement at the end of the period of suspension upon filing of the Affidavit. 
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The OPC received Mr. Rasmussen's proposed Order of Reinstatement on 
February 17, 2011 at 4:30 pm. The OPC was not allowed the five days to object to Mr. 
Rasmussen's order. Rather the Order was signed on the same day it was presented to 
the Court and the OPC. 
CONCLUSION 
There has been no error made by the Office of Professional Conduct in this case. 
All of its actions have been consistent with its understanding and position that Mr. 
Rasmussen's reinstatement should be governed by Rule 14-525 of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability, not 14-524 of these rules. Furthermore, notwithstanding Mr. 
Rasmussen's reply, all of his actions have also been consistent with reinstatement under 
14-525. Therefore, the OPC respectfully requests that the Court set aside its 
Reinstatement Order of February 17, 2011 and allow this matter to proceed in accordance 
with Rule 14-525. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of February, 2011. 
ff.VJjlj 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of February, 2011, I caused to be mailed a 
true and correct copy of The Office of Professional Conduct's Reply to Reply to Its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen to: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen ; 
4659 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ^ 
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I 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077 
E-mail: opc@utahbar.org 
December 20, 2010 
James H. Deans 
440 South 700 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: in the Matter of the Discipline of Thomas V. Rasmussen ]'"" 
Civil No. 090908841 
Dear Mr. Deans: 
This morning the OPC was notified that Mr. Rasmussen called the 8th 
District Court and held himself out as an attorney representing a client. It also 
appears that Mr. Rasmussen did not notify the court of his suspension. As you 
are aware, the Order of Sanction in this matter was. signed on July 21, 2010. 
Pursuant to Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, unless 
otherwise stated in the order, a suspension is effective 30 days after the.date of 
the order. 
Because Mr. Rasmussen has been suspended for six months and a day, 
he may not represent clients, hold himself out as an attorney or otherwise 
engage in the practice of law. If Mr. Rasmussen continues to practice while on 
suspension the OPC will file an Order to Show Cause. Also to date, we have.not-
received anything from Mr. Rasmussen regarding his obligations under Rule 14-
526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
I direct your attention to Rule 14-526 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability with respect to Mr. Rasmussen's responsibilities. Thank you for 
your attention to this matter 
Sincerely, 
Diane Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
DA/aw 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT "B" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Notice of Petition for Reinstatement to the Utah State Bar 
by Thomas V. Rasmussen 
Pursuant to Rule 14-525(d), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the Utah 
State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct hereby publishes notice of 
Respondent's Verified Petition for Reinstatement and Affidavit of Thomas V. 
Rasmussen ("Petition") filed by Thomas V. Rasmussen in In the Matter of the 
Discipline of Thomas V. Rasmussen, Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 
090908841. Any individuals wishing to oppose or concur with the Petition are 
requested to do so within thirty days of the date of this publication by filing notice 
with the District Court. 
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Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
Thomas V. Rasmussen #02693 
Respondent. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR THE COURT TO 
| CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF 
) THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN'S 
) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS 
| SANCTIONS ORDER 
i Civil No. 090908841 
Judge L. A. Dever 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"), by and through 
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel, and in accordance with Rule 7(c) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and this Court's Ruling issued as a result of the March 8, 2011 hearing, 
hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Motion for the Court to Consider 
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with its Sanctions Order dated 
July 21, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 21, 2010 the Court entered a Sanctions Order which stated: 
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The Court will enter a suspension for one year in this matter but will 
stay all but 181 days. The Court is staying the imposition of the 
remaining time upon the following terms and conditions: 
1. That he [Mr. Rasmussen] enter and complete an ethics and 
professional conduct course by the end of the 181 day 
suspension. 
2. That he [Mr. Rasmussen] not practice law during the 
suspension and so certify that fact by affidavit. 
3. That he [Mr. Rasmussen] have no violations of the rules for 
one year from the date of this Order. 
4. That he [Mr. Rasmussen] will initiate a change in his office 
procedure whereby he [Mr. Rasmussen] personally 
communicates with the Court, its staff and opposing counsel 
and all such communication will be memorialized in his case 
file and will include the date, time and named individual 
communicated with. Additionally, all changes of court dates 
must be followed by written communication to the Court. 
2. The effective date of the Sanctions Order was August 19, 2010. 
3. Mr. Rasmussen filed a Verified Petition 158 days from the effective date of 
the Sanctions Order on January 24, 2011 stating he had complied with the terms and 
conditions of the Sanctions Order. 
4. Mr. Rasmussen also, 158 days from the effective date of the Sanctions 
Order, filed an Affidavit dated January 24, 2011 stating he had not practiced law for a 
total of 181 days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement. 
5, Mr. Rasmussen was readmitted by Court Order on February 17, 2011. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. RASMUSEN HAS PRACTICED LAW THROUGH THE DURATION 
OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS SUSPENSION 
The second term and condition of the Court's Order instructed Mr. Rasmussen, 
not to "practice law during the suspension and so certify that fact by affidavit." Yet on 
December 22, 2010, Judge Vernice Trease, Third District Court, contacted the OPC 
regarding Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen appeared in Judge Trease's court on 
December 17, 2010 in case 101905250, State of Utah vs. Michael Charles Smoot After 
the OPC learned of Mr. Rasmussen's appearance before Judge Trease, and in 
anticipation of Mr. Rasmussen's request for reinstatement, the OPC contacted the 
Administrative Offices of the Courts and requested a list of all of Mr. Rasmussen's 
cases. From that listing the OPC created a spreadsheet chronicling Mr. Rasmussen's 
extensive and flagrant refusal to comply with the Court's Order. A copy of the 
spreadsheet is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The OPC is in the process of obtaining certified dockets of all the cases 
represented on the spreadsheet. Once obtained, the OPC will present this evidence to 
the Court. The spreadsheet details the name of the client, case numbers, and dates 
when Mr. Rasmussen appeared in court, filed pleadings with the court, or had his office 
contact the Court. After the effective date of the suspension, Mr. Rasmussen had a 
case in Federal Court, cases in 13 Justice Courts (South Jordan, Box Elder, Draper, 
Herriman, Davis, Salt Lake County, South Salt Lake, Taylorsville, Bluffdale, Midvale, 
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Summit, Sevier, and Utah County) and in three District Courts (Eighth - Duchesne, 
Eighth - Uintah, and Third - Salt Lake City). More specifically, according to the dockets 
Mr. Rasmussen made 36 appearances on cases; filed 17 pleadings in cases and had 
his office contact the court on cases nine times after the effective date of his 
suspension. 
II. SINCE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS SUSPENSION THE OPC HAS 
RECEIVED ONE OFFICIAL BAR COMPLAINT AND TWO UNOFFICIAL 
BAR COMPLAINTS AGAINST MR. RASMUSSEN ALLEGING RULE OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VIOLATIONS.1 
One official Bar Complaint was filed with the OPC against Mr. Rasmussen on or 
about September 10, 2010 by Kevin Loughrin. Mr. Rasmussen was retained for a 
federal court criminal case prior to the effective date of his suspension in June 2010. Mr. 
Loughrin alleges that during the representation Mr. Rasmussen did not adequately 
communicate with him, including a failure to provide Mr. Loughrin with information that 
Mr. Rasmussen received in discovery until repeated requests had been made. Based 
on the lack of communication, Mr. Loughrin asked Mr. Rasmussen to withdraw from the 
case, which Mr. Rasmussen did on or about October 5, 2010. However, before Mr. 
Rasmussen's withdrawal according to Mr. Loughrin subsequent counsel, Mr. 
Rasmussen threatened Mr. Loughrin with respect to his sentencing recommendation, if 
Official Bar Complaints have to be notarized and verified attesting to the accuracy of the information pursuant to 
Rule 14-510(a)(2) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The OPC can consider unofficial Bar 
Complaints pursuant to Rule 14-504(b)(2) of these Rules. 
A 
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he did not drop his Bar Complaint. These allegations raise the possibility of violations of 
Rule 1.4 (Communication) and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under 
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, Mr. 
Rasmussen appeared in Court and filed pleadings on Mr. Loughrin's behalf after the 
effective date of his suspension as noted in Exhibit A. 
Mr. Mark Rasmussen filed an unofficial Bar Complaint with the OPC on about 
November 15, 2010. Mr. Mark Rasmussen was "given" a DUI on or about August 20, 
2010. Mr. Mark Rasmussen paid Mr. Rasmussen $1200.00 for representation on the 
DUI. According to Mr. Mark Rasmussen, Mr. Rasmussen failed to appear at the 
hearings and did not return phone calls between November 4, 2010 and November 15, 
2010. These allegations raise the possibility of violations of 1.1 (Competence) and 1.4 
(Communication) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, based on the dates 
of Mr. Mark Rasmussen's allegations, it appears that the entire representation occurred 
after the effective date of Mr. Rasmussen's suspension. 
Mr. Troy Bragg filed an unofficial Bar Complaint on or about December 10, 2010. 
Mr. Bragg was charged with several felonies. Mr. Rasmussen filed an appearance of 
counsel on behalf of Mr. Bragg on or about June 10, 2010. Mr. Bragg claimed he paid 
Mr. Rasmussen approximately $7000.00 to get a plea agreement. However, on or about 
October 19, 2010, according to the court docket Mr. Rasmussen withdrew because Mr. 
Bragg lost his job and was unable to continue to pay Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Bragg claims 
that Mr. Rasmussen's progress in the case was not consistent with what he was paid. 
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These allegations raise the possibility of an excessive fee and a violation of rule 1.5 
(Fees) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, again, Mr. Rasmussen 
appeared in court and filed pleadings on behalf of Mr. Bragg in the Eighth District -
Vernal Uintah County after the effective date of his suspension. See Exhibit A. 
The complaints filed by Loughrin, Mark Rasmussen, and Bragg on their face 
raise the real possibility that Mr. Rasmussen violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. If this is the case, Mr. Rasmussen violated the second term of the Court's 
Sanction Order that "he have no violations of the Rules for one year from the dates of 
[the] Order." And as outlined above, Mr. Rasmussen practiced law after the effective 
date of his suspension in each of the cases. 
Hi. MR. RASMUSSEN SHOULD BE DISBARRED 
Based on the evidence of Mr. Rasmussen's continued disregard of the Court's 
Sanction Order, the OPC requests that the Court impose additional discipline pursuant 
to Rule 14-606(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. This rule states: 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the 
factors set out in Rule 14-604, the following principles generally apply in 
cases involving prior discipline, (a) The district court or Supreme Court 
may impose further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the terms of a 
prior disciplinary order. 
Mr. Rasmussen clearly knew the effective date of his suspension was August 19, 
2010. See Mr. Rasmussen's reference to this in his timeline in the Reply to 
Memorandum in Opposition to Order of Reinstatement of Thomas V. Rasmussen filed 
on February 25, 2011. Mr. Rasmussen also claims to have not practiced law for 181 
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days as of February 17, 2011, the date of his reinstatement. February 17, 2011 is 182 
days from August 19, 2010. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Rasmussen's claim, the evidence seems to show an 
extensive and flagrant continuing practice of law. Thus, given the extensive and flagrant 
continuing practice of law activities of Mr. Rasmussen, the OPC respectfully requests 
that Mr. Rasmussen be disbarred consistent with the case of In re Richard Johnson 830 
P.2d 262 (Utah 1992). In that case Mr. Johnson was initially suspended for six months. 
However, during the six month suspension period Mr. Johnson continued to practice law 
"in flagrant disregard of this court's order of suspension dated March 29, 1990." Based 
on this the Court disbarred Mr. Johnson.2 
It should also be noted that Mr. Rasmussen has an additional level of dishonesty 
as represented by filing an affidavit with the Court certifying that he had not practiced 
law for 181 days up to the time of his anticipated reinstatement. The evidence shows 
otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rasmussen has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by practicing 
throughout the effective date of his suspension which is clearly a violation of the Court's 
2
 The Johnson case is to be contrasted with In re Russell T. Doncouse 99 P.3d 837 (Utah 2004) where an attorney 
initially was suspended for 90 days; practiced law while suspended and the Utah Supreme Court increased the 
suspension to three years. The Supreme Court specifically distinguished Doncouse from Johnson by stating that Mr. 
Doncouse's activities were not as "extensive or flagrant as Johnson's nor did they engender new complaints with the 
Bar." Mr. Rasmussen's practice of law activities are numerous like Johnson's and like Johnson did generate new Bar 
Complaints. 
"7 
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Sanction's Order. Furthermore, new Bar Complaints submitted to the OPC raise the real 
possibility that Mr. Rasmussen violated the Rules of Professional Conduct which is also a 
violation of the Sanctions Order. The OPC respectfully requests that the Court determine 
that the appropriate sanction for Mr. Rasmussen's blatant refusal to comply with the 
Court's Order is disbarment. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2011. 
Billy L Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of March, 2011, I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the Memorandum in Support of Motion for the Court to Consider 
Evidence of Thomas V. Rasmussen's Failure to Comply with Sanctions Order to: 
James H. Deans 
440 South 700 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
filis^Wi^k 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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Case No. Client's Name Court Appearance Pleadings Filed Called Court 
1101800285 
1101800278 
104800042 
J101905987 
101905250 
101904427 
101903156 
101901215 
091908954 
101800246 
AbefRobledo 
Christopher Wiersma 
Christopher Wiersma 
Jacque Clarke 
Michael Smoot 
Breanna Zehnder 
R. Steele Maxfield 
Jeremias Mullins 
Lamar Bowman Jr. 
Troy Bragg 
Eighth 
Duchesne 
Eighth 
Duchesne 
Eighth 
Duchesne 
Third 
Salt Lake City 
Third 
Salt Lake City 
Third 
Salt Lake City 
Third 
Salt Lake City 
Third 
Salt Lake City 
Third 
Salt Lake city 
Eighth 
Uintah 
10/7/2010 
10/18/2010 
9/16/2010 
10/7/2010 
10/14/2010 
11/18/2010 
12/14/2010 
9/21/2010 
12/17/2010 
8/20/2010 
9/21/2010 
10/12/2010 
9/17/2010 
8/30/2010 
10/18/2010 
11/8/2010 
11/15/2010 
8/20/2010 
9/10/2010 
10/19/2010 
10/22/2010 
9/30/2010 
10/1/2010 
8/23/2010 
11/18/2010 
9/9/2010 
1/18/2011 
9/7/2010 
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Case No. Client's Name Court Appearance Pleadings Filed Called Court 
105806113 
105005091 
101100502 
101300136 
105011468 
105606717 
105504766 
105107297 
101200072 
105007198 
105203006 
101000469 
101600453 
105036696 
105101250 
2:10-cr-00478 
Saravanan Thangaraj 
James Willis 
R. Douglas Poole 
John Gibson 
Preston Tait 
Glen Webster 
Courtney Garcia 
Trudy Robertson 
Kirk Rindlisbach 
Feuan Nhothibouth 
Justin Nielsen 
Elton Richard Cox 
Patrick Drowne 
Scott Sullivan 
Robert Hatch 
Kevin Loughrin 
South Jordan 
Box Elder 
Draper 
Herriman 
Davis 
Salt Lake Co. 
South Salt Lake 
Taylorsville 
Bluffdale 
Midvale 
Summit 
Midvale 
Salt Lake County 
Sevier 
Utah County 
Federal Court 
12/7/2010 
12/3/2010 
12/14/2010 
10/6/2010 
11/2/2010 
10/13/2010 
11/10/2010 
11/4/2010 
8/31/2010 
12/7/2010 
10/15/2010 
9/13/2010 
11/16/2010 
8/25/2010 
| 8/20/2010 
10/5/2010 
11/9/2010 
12/14/2010 
11/4/2010 
12/13/2010 ! 
11/10/2010 
10/22/2010 
10/18/2010 
8/20/2010 
10/8/2010 
10/11/2010 
9/13/2010 
12/14/2010 I 
1/27/2011 
10/6/2010 
12/13/2010 
9/7/2010 
9/29/2010 
10/14/2010 
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